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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Luis James Pierce appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation. Notwithstanding the fact that his appeal is from an order revoking
probation, Pierce also requests his underlying conviction be vacated.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas
Pierce was arrested after having sexual contact with a four-year old girl he
was babysitting. The pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI") sets forth the facts
leading to Pierce's arrest:

(9114106 PSI, p.2.)
The state filed a complaint charging Pierce with sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years. (Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Complaint.) In that
complaint, the state neglected to assert that Pierce was over the age of eighteen.
Pierce was arraigned on this charge and a preliminary hearing was set.
(Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Ada County Magistrate Minutes.) However, on the
date set for the preliminary hearing, the state filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint which was granted.

(Augmented Record: 3120106 Ada County

Magistrate Minutes; 3120106 Order of Release.) The state filed a new complaint
the following day alleging the same crime but specifying that Pierce was over the
age of eighteen when the crime occurred. (R., pp.7-8). Pierce was bound over
to the district court following a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.13-21.)
Pierce pled guilty and was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years,
with five years fixed. (R., pp.41, 51-54.) The district court retained jurisdiction,
however, and placed Pierce in the retained jurisdiction program. (R., pp.52-53.)
Pierce completed the program and was placed on probation for a period of

fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.) Seven months into Pierce's probation, the state
filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.78-81.) Pierce admitted to violating
his probation by frequenting places where minors or victims of choice
congregate, by failing to complete sex offender treatment, and by failing to pay
his supervision fees. (12/13/07 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.1 I , L.20.)
The district court revoked Pierce's probation and ordered his underlying
sentence executed. (R., pp.89-91.) Pierce filed a timely Notice of Appeal from
the Order of Revocation of Probation, Imposition of Sentence and Commitment.
(R., pp.92-94.)

ISSUES
Pierce states the issues on appeal as:
1

Has Mr. Pierce's right to be free from trial by Information
after a grand jury has ignored a charge, protected by Article I
§ 8 of the Idaho Constitution, been violated requiring that his
conviction be vacated as the district court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crime?

2

Did the district court abuse its discretion after Mr. Pierce
admitted to violating his probation by executing his original
sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case?

(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Pierce failed to show he is entitled to vacate his underlying
1.
conviction in an appeal from an order revoking probation where he entered a
valid guilty plea waiving any defect in the probable cause determination?
Has Pierce failed to meet his burden of showing his constitutional
2.
rights were violated as a result of the grand jury allegedly ignoring the charge
against him where there is no evidence in the record to support such a claim?

3.
Has Pierce failed to carry his burden of establishing the district
court clearly abused its discretion when it ordered executed the originally
imposed sentence upon revocation of Pierce's probation?

ARGUMENT
I.
Pierce Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishinq A Jurisdictional Claim And
Therefore Waived His Claim Of Error When He Entered His Guilty Plea

A.

Introduction
Pierce seeks to vacate his conviction by claiming the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over his case due to an alleged violation of Article I, §
8 of the ldaho Constitution. Pierce's claim fails because Article I, § 8 is not a
jurisdictional provision and, therefore, any claimed defect was waived when
Pierce pled guilty.
B.

Standard Of Review
Jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. State v. Kavaiecz, 139

ldaho 482,483,80 P.3d 1083,1084 (2003).
C.

Article I. 5 8 Is Not A Jurisdictional Provision And, Even If It Could Be
Construed As Such, It Would Relate To A Court's Personal Jurisdiction
Not Subiect Matter Jurisdiction
Pierce claims the district court lacked jurisdiction in his underlying criminal

action because he claims the prosecutor violated Article I,

9 8 of the ldaho

Constitution. That constitutional provision provides:
Prosecutions only by indictment or information. -- No person
shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a
magistrate, except in cases of impeachment, in cases cognizable
by probate courts or by justices of the peace, and in cases arising
in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
provided, that a grand jury may be summoned upon the order of the
district court in the manner provided by law, and provided further,
that after a charge has been ignored by a grand jury, no person

shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon information of
the public prosecutor.
According to Pierce, an information filed in violation of Article I, § 8,,.&i

an

information filed after the charge is submitted and ignored by a grand jury, is a
"nullity" and fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1316.) As set forth below, this claim is without merit. Pierce acknowledges the
absence of any authority to support his claim', but argues such a conclusion is
compelled by "the plain reading of the constitutional provision" and the dissenting
opinion in State v. Wilson, 41 ldaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925). (Appellant's Brief,
pp.14-16.) Even assuming arguendo that the information in this case was filed in
violation of Article I, ij 8, Pierce's claim that the information was a nullity and
failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court fails.
The courts of ldaho are vested with the subject matter jurisdiction
conferred upon them by the ldaho Constitution and the statutes of this state.
Pursuant to Article V, § 20 of the ldaho Constitution and I.C. §§ 1-705 and 18202, the district courts of ldaho are vested with original subject matter jurisdiction
over all crimes committed within this state. See also State v. Doyle, 121 ldaho
91 1, 828 P.2d 1316 (1992) (an ldaho court will have subject matter jurisdiction
over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs

' The only authority Pierce cites is the dissenting opinion in State v. Wilson, 41
ldaho 616, 242 P. 787 (1925). The state acknowledges that in Wilson a
dissenting justice asserted that a violation of Article I, 9 8 deprived the court of
jurisdiction and that as a result the "verdict of guilty and the judgment of
conviction thereon are void." 41 ldaho at 616. 242 P. at 792. Although, the
majority never addressed the issue directly, the majority obviously rejected this
argument because it affirmed Wilson's conviction. d.at 607.

within ldaho). It is well established that it is the charging document that confers
subject matter jurisdiction on a district court. State v. Ro~ers,140 ldaho 223,
228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) ("The information, indictment, or complaint
alleging an offense was committed within the state of ldaho confers subject
matter jurisdiction upon the court.") (citing State v. Slater, 71 ldaho 335, 338, 231
P.2d 424, 425 (1951)). The jurisdictional question presented by any charging
document is whether it alleges that a criminal offense was committed within the
state of ldaho. State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02
(2004). The ldaho Court of Appeals has clearly explained what constitutes a
jurisdictional defect and what deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction: "A
jurisdictional defect exists in an indictment or information: 1) when the alleged
facts are not made criminal by statute; 2) there is a failure to state facts essential
to establish the offense charged; 3) the alleged facts show on their face that the
court has no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or 4) the allegations fail to show
that the offense charged was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court." State v. Izzard, 136 ldaho 124, 127, 29 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct. App. 2001).
None of the above mentioned defects exist in this case. The information
Pierce pled guilty to alleged facts sufficient to charge an offense made criminal
by statute and that the crime was committed in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. (R., pp.20-21.) Accordingly, Pierce has failed to meet his burden of
showing that the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction.
Pierce nevertheless argues that, regardless of the information's facial
validity, the indictment process was jurisdictionally defective in light of Article I, §

8. As a result, he claims he can challenge his conviction at anytime. Pierce is
mistaken. Article I, § 8 is not a jurisdictional provision but a constitutionally
provided affirmative defense.
A plain reading of the text of Article I, 3 8 makes clear that if a prosecutor
elects to proceed to a probable cause determination via grand jury and the
grand jury ignores the charge, LC,

returns a no bill, the prosecutor is precluded

from filing the same charge by way of information. Article I, § 8 is a procedural
framework that governs how the state may charge an individual with a crime. In
this sense it is like another ldaho constitutional provision, the double jeopardy
clause, and operates as an affirmative defense to prosecution under certain
circumstances.

ldaho Constitution Article I, § 13 ("No person shall be twice

put in jeopardy for the same offense."); see also U.S. Const. amend. V. "An
affirmative defense is an argument or assertion of fact that, if true, will defeat the
plaintiffs claim even if all allegations in the complaint are true."
Disposal, Inc, v. Wee Haul, LLC, 170 P.3d 508, 513 (Nev. 2007).

Douulas
However,

affirmative defenses such as double jeopardy are not jurisdictional and may be
waived. See State v. Maaill, 119 ldaho 218, 219-20, 804 P.2d 947, 948-49 (Ct.
App. 1991) (defendant's guilty plea was not conditional and waived issues of
venue and double jeopardy). There is no basis for distinguishing between the
affirmative defense provided by Article I, § 8 and the double jeopardy provision
found in Article I, § 13. Neither provision says anything about jurisdiction, yet
both provide bars to subsequent prosecution.

Because Article I, 3 8 is an affirmative defense and not jurisdictional it can
be waived by the entry of a valid plea. "Ordinarily, a valid plea of guilty waives all
non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in
prior proceedings." State v. Kelchner, 130 ldaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682
(1997); State v. Book, 127 ldaho 352, 354, 900 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1995); State v.
Salinas, 134 ldaho 362, 367, 2 P.3d 747, 752 (Ct. App. 2000) (guilty plea waives
all non-jurisdictional challenges to conviction for purposes of direct appeal).
Here, Pierce pled guilty to sexual abuse of a minor. (08/01106 Tr., p.1, L.l - p.16,
L.21.) Consequently, Pierce waived his right to make a challenge under Article I,

Pierce's claim also fails even if it is viewed not as an affirmative defense
but as a general challenge to the probable cause determination.

Because

defects in the probable cause determination process do not deprive courts of
subject matter jurisdiction, ldaho courts require challenges to those defects be
made in a timely manner. State v. Fowler, 105 ldaho 642, 671 P.2d 1106 (Ct.
App. 1983), illustrates this principle.
In

Fowler

the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction

because of a defect in the preliminary hearing process. 105 ldaho at 643, 671
P.2d at 1106.

The court of appeals concluded Fowler waived his right to

challenge the probable cause determination once he pled guilty:
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his
right to contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a
preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause
to require the accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid
plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or

statutory, in prior proceedings. Here Fowler does not attack the
entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of guilty to the restaurant
burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the procedure to
determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the preliminary
hearing itself, on that charge.
Id. (emphasis added,
-

internal citations omitted). Here, just like in

Fowler, the

claimed defect is in the process and procedure to determine probable cause.
Thus, here, just as in Fowler, Pierce waived any claimed defect in that process
by entering his guilty plea.
In sum, Article I,

3

8 is not jurisdictional but a constitutionally provided

affirmative defense akin to double jeopardy. As such, the defense was waived
when Pierce pled guilty. To the extent Pierce's claim is construed as a challenge
to the probable cause determination, any such claim was also waived as a result
of Pierce's guilty plea.
II.
Pierce Has Failed To Show From The Record That The Grand Jurv Heard And
Lqnored The Charqe Aqainst Him Or. In The Alternative, That His Claim Was Not
Waived When He Entered His Guiltv Plea
A.

Introduction
Pierce claims "a grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge against

him despite the fact that there is no official document in the record indicating as
such."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

Pierce's claim is without merit. There is no

evidence that the "grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge against
him." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record to

substantiate his claim of error. In the absence of an adequate record, error will
not be presumed; rather, missing portions of the record must be presumed to
support the action of the trial court. Retamoza v. State, 125 ldaho 792, 795, 874
P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1994).
C.

The Record Does Not Establish That The Grand Jury Heard A Charge
Against Pierce Or That The Grand Jurv Ignored That Charge Prior To An
Information Beins Filed Against Him
Pierce claims a grand jury ignored the child abuse charge against him

prior to the filing of the information. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) Pierce, however,
has failed to support this claim with evidence from the record and, therefore, has
failed to meet his burden of establishing a valid claim. As set forth above, Article
I, 3 8 of the ldaho Constitution states "that after a charge has been ignored by a
grand jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon
information of the public prosecutor." Pierce concedes "[nlo document exists in
the record unquestionably showing that a grand jury heard and ignored the
charge against Mr. Pierce." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Nevertheless, he claims he
has met his burden because of a single off-hand and unrelated statement made
by a prosecutor who was not the primary prosecutor handling the case. That
statement, in context, made at Pierce's sentencing hearing, was as follows:
THE COURT: And has the State received these materials,
Ms. Fisher, and had adequate time to review them?

MS. FISHER: I have, Your Honor. And what was not
included in those that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two
photographs of the children in question. I would like to include
those for purposes of the pre-sentence investigation. These were
shown to the grand jury as well.
(10/25/06 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 14-23.) Pierce claims this single and isolated statement
is sufficient proof that the grand jury both heard and ignored the charge against
him. Pierce is mistaken. In no way does this isolated statement satisfy Pierce's
burden of proving that a grand jury heard and ignored the charge against him.
There is nothing in the record that supports Pierce's claim that the
prosecutor's statement was an "admission" that a grand jury reviewed this case.
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Indeed, the record reveals evidence of the contrary -that the prosecuting attorney was confused or simply made a mistake. As
admitted by Pierce, there is no documentation that supports the claim that the
grand jury heard and ignored Pierce's case. Not only is there no documentation
or record of a grand jury reviewing the case, but the documentation that does
exist shows that this case proceeded by complaint, which was filed the day after
law enforcement interviewed Pierce regarding the allegations. (Compare 9/14/06
PSI, p.2 (indicating interview with law enforcement on 3/6/06) with original
complaint (Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Complaint)). Pierce was arraigned that
same day and a preliminary hearing was set for March 20, 2006. The case was
dismissed on the date of the preliminary hearing and a new complaint was filed
the following day. (Augmented Record: 3120106 Ada County Magistrate Minutes,
Order of Release dated 3120106.)

Pierce's assumption that the state was

simultaneously attempting to proceed against him via grand jury indictment has
no support in the record
Pierce also relies on a letter from the Ada County Court Clerk, J. David
Navarro made in response to the Supreme Court's order to conduct a search of
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce. (12/12/08 Response of the District
Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination (emphasis added)). Pierce argues
this Court should determine that this letter is factual support for his claim that a
grand jury heard and ignored the charge against him. As a threshold matter,
however, Pierce's reliance is misplaced.

It is inappropriate to request an

appellate court to make a factual determination on evidence not before the
district court.

See

Weekly v. City of Mesa, 888 P.2d 1346, 1353 (Ariz. App.

1994) ("We will not presume to make such factual determinations for the first time
on appeal.").
Even if this Court considers the letter, the letter does not support Pierce's
claim that it is evidence that a grand jury heard and ignored the charge against
him. The clerk responded to the Supreme Court's order to conduct a search of
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce as follows:
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any
records regarding grand jury proceedings involving the DefendantAppellant nor any information that such proceedings took place.
The staffs search indicated that records of three grand jury
proceedings (Nos. 22, 23 and 24), which may have taken place
during the approximate time frame, were not received by the clerk's
office. The clerk's staff was unable to find any grand jury minutes,
voting records, or other documents showing that a grand jury
declined to issue an indictment against the Defendant-Appellant.

(12/12/08 Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination
(emphasis added)). Despite making clear that there were no records regarding
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce, Pierce nonetheless argues that the
response supports his claim. Specifically, he argues the letter shows there were
actual grand proceedings on those days and the fact that there is no evidence of
the grand jury ignoring the charge against him means little because the
proceedings are secret and because there is "no criminal rule that specifically
states what a grand jury is to do when they 'ignore' a charge." (Appellant's Brief,
pp.19-21.) Pierce fails to appreciate, however, the clerk's response that although
there "may have been" grand jury proceedings on the days in question, there
were simply no records involving Pierce -- "no grand jury minutes, voting records,
or other documents showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment
against" Pierce. (12/12/08 Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re:
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury
Determination). Again, evidence that contradicts Pierce's claim that a grand jury
ignored the claim against him.
111.
Pierce Has Failed To Establish The District Court Clearly Abused Its Discretion
When It Ordered Executed The Previously Imposed Sentence Upon Revokinq
Pierce's Probation

A.

Introduction
Pierce also contends the district court abused its discretion when, upon

revoking Pierce's probation, it ordered executed the previously imposed, but

suspended, fifteen-year sentence with five years fixed. (Appellant's Brief, p.23.)
Specifically, Pierce claims his sentence is excessive "considering the nature of
his criminal act and his actions since that time."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.23.)

Pierce has failed to show an abuse of discretion because Pierce has failed to
establish how the sentence has been rendered unreasonable since imposition of
his sentence.
B.

Standard Of Review
To prevail on appeal, Pierce must establish that the district court clearly

abused its discretion in ordering executed the previously imposed sentence.

See

State v. Grove, 109 ldaho 372, 707 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Tucker,
103 ldaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982). The court may, after a probation
violation has been proven, order the suspended sentence to be executed or, in
the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence.
State v. Marks, 116 ldaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). On
review, the appellate court must determine whether the district court acted within
the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to
its specific choices, and whether the district court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Beckett, 122 ldaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327(Ct.
App. 1992).
However, if the original sentence was not appealed, an appellate court will
not review that original sentence for excessiveness upon the facts then existing.

m,109 ldaho at 373, 707 P.2d at 484; Tucker, 103 ldaho at 887-88, 655
P.2d at 94-95.

Rather, the focus is upon all circumstances bearing on the

decision to order the previously imposed sentence into execution, including
events occurring between the original pronouncement of sentence and the
revocation of probation.
C.

m,109 ldaho at 373,707 P.2d at 484.

Pierce Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Clearly Abused Its
Discretion When It Ordered Executed The Oriainallv Imposed Sentence
Upon Revocation Of Probation
Pierce first argues the district court abused its discretion by ordering

executed the original sentence because "of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.)

Because Pierce did not

directly appeal the original sentence for child abuse he "may not now challenge
the reasonableness of the sentence originally imposed." State v. Coffin, 122
ldaho 392, 394, 834 P.2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 1992).

Rather, the focus is

"restricted to a determination of whether [Pierce's] sentence now appears
excessive in light of circumsta'nces existing when the court ordered the sentence
to beexecuted upon revocation of probation." Jcj. Pierce has failed to meet his
burden.
While Pierce goes to great lengths to describe the unreasonableness of
his underlying sentence in reference to circumstances at that time, see, e.g., "it
should be recognized that the nature of Mr. Pierce's offense, while certainly
criminal and deserving of punishment, was not severe" (Appellant's Brief, p.24),
"in exchange for nothing, Mr. Pierce agreed to plead guilty" (Appellant's Brief,
p.25), "Mr. Pierce was 23 years old at the time of his original sentencing"
(Appellant's Brief, p.25) and "Mr. Pierce's biggest problem is his alcoholism"
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26), there is very little regarding his actions between the

original pronouncement of sentence and the revocation of probation. Indeed, the
only argument Pierce makes is that during this time period he admitted to
violating his probation and did not re-offend by committing an additional sex
crime or another criminal act.

Such claims, even if true, do not render a

reasonably imposed sentence unreasonable.
In contrast, the probation officers that filed the report of probation violation
concluded that from the time of his release on probation "Pierce has worked hard
at flying under the radar of Bethal Ministries and Probation & Parole" and that "he
is more motivated toward associating with prohibited persons and minors than he
is in addressing the thoughts and behaviors that led to his conviction." (Report of
Probation Violation, p.5 (attached to 1/25/08 PSI).) The officer concluded Pierce
"sees nothing wrong with having physical contact with minors, despite his instant
offense and probation conditions prohibiting such contacts."

The probation

officer reached these conclusions because Pierce failed to participate in any sex
offender treatment as required, ignored conditions of his probation by going to
places where children congregate, and by failing to pay certain fees.

Id.

In light of these statements, the record clearly demonstrates probation
was not effective. Pierce refused to attend the treatment he was under court
order to complete. Pierce committed a sexual crime against a child and his
treatment is necessary to ensure the protection of society. Furthermore, as his
actions have indicated, he is unwilling to do what the court asks of him.
Considering all the facts of this case, Pierce has failed to establish the district

court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering his sentence
executed without reduction.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests Pierce's conviction, probation revocation,
and sentence be affirmed.
DATED this 28th day of May 2009.
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